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RETHINKING THE ROLE OF THE WAR POWERS
RESOLUTION: CONGRESS AND THE PERSIAN
GULF WAR
Eileen Burgin*
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990-1991) prompted the most rapid and massive
deployment of United States military power, as well as the largest war involving U.S.
troops, since passage of the War Powers Resolution (WPR) in 1973. The troop activity
in the Persian Gulf also represented exactly the sort of situation in which the WPR
sponsors intended the law to apply.' According to the law's intent, Congress would be
in on decisions from before the takeoff and through the landing; this codetermination
would occur through such means as consultation, presidential reporting, and the trig-
gering of the sixty-day clock.
Yet the WPR clearly failed to meet its objectives during the Gulf crisis, many
scholars and observers contended; even more important, these critics resoundingly
pronounced the law a "dead letter," irrelevant and useless.2 For instance, legal scholar
Michael Glennon claimed the Persian Gulf events highlighted the "fecklessness" of the
WPR;3 political scientist John Rourke labeled the WPR a "largely empty vessel;"4
commentator Ted Koppell on Nightline asked Senator Robert Kerrey if the measure
was simply an "archaic joke;"5 and former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman wrote,
"Desert Storm drove the final nail" into the law.6 Some members of Congress echoed
these assessments: Representative Peter DeFazio argued in October 1990, for example,
that "the final and complete unraveling" of the WPR was occurring.!
Certainly, much agreement exists on the WPR's failure to achieve its sponsors'
goals in the Gulf crisis.' An examination of presidential and congressional actions
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1. 137 CoNG. REc. H103 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 1991) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez). See also Pat M.
Holt, It's Time for Congress to Get Into the Act, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept. 5, 1990, at 19.
2. The "dead letter" analogy is common: see Holt, supra note 1; and Will Marshall, Going to
War Should Be a Shared Decision, Newsday, Dec. 12, 1990, at 125.
3. Michael J. Glennon, The Gulf War and the Constitution, 70 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 84, 85 (Spring
1991).
4. JOHN T. ROURKE, PRESIDENTIAL WARS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 145 (1993).
5. Nightline: Whatever Happened to the War Powers Act? (American Broadcasting Corporation,
Sept. 20, 1990) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ABC News File.
6. JOHN LEHMAN, MAKING WAR: THE 200-YEAR OLD BATTLE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND
CONGRESS OVER How AMERICA GOES TO WAR 53 (1992).
7. 136 Cong. Rec. H8454 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1990) (statement of Rep. DeFazio).
8. ROBERT F. TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION 160-64 (1991). But cf. STAFF
OF SUBCOMM. ON ARMS CONTROL, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, AND SCIENCE, HOUSE COMM. ON FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS, 102D CONG., IST SESS., THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS: RELEVANT DOCUMENTS, CORRE-
SPONDENCE, REPORTS 133-34 (Comm. Print 1991) (statement of Rep. Dante Fascell, former Chairman
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from August 1990 through January 1991 illuminates the fact that the WPR did not
function as its authors intended. That failure, however, does not necessarily reduce the
law to an academic curiosity, with no real influence upon congressional or presidential
action. In this paper I show, contrary to conventional wisdom, that the WPR affected
Congress in the Persian Gulf crisis-the WPR affected Congress in many subtle and
indirect ways. Thus, the WPR's impact is far less direct than the law's sponsors in-
tended under some of the mechanistic procedures they created, but the impact remains
real, especially in the eyes of congressional participants.
Before delving in to this matter, it is necessary to set the stage by very briefly
reviewing both the WPR's various provisions, and the key, relevant events from Au-
gust 1990 through January 1991 from a congressional and WPR perspective. I then
examine the Bush administration's compliance record with the law, as well as the
congressional response to the administration's interpretation of the law and its WPR
obligations. In the next section I explore and explain how, despite appearances to the
contrary, the WPR nonetheless affected congressional action according to the partici-
pants themselves. The discussion here draws on data and information gathered from
interviews with congressional staff people, members of Congress, and senior Bush
administration officials. The final section considers these conflicting views of the WPR
to offer a more balanced assessment of the law.
I. PROVISIONS OF THE WPR
The major purpose of the WPR is to "insure that the collective judgment of both
the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed
Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces .... 9
To this end, the law includes three principal procedures: presidential consultation with
Congress, executive reports to Congress, and congressional action regarding military
ventures. In this section I discuss these procedures as well as a WPR provision relating
to the interpretation of the law.
A. Consultation
Section 3 of the WPR addresses consultation. The law stipulates that "the Presi-
dent in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United
States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances ...."" Consultation is to continue
while troops remain engaged.
The 1973 House report accompanying the WPR sought to clarify some of the
textual ambiguities in these consultation requirements. Most importantly, in terms of
the definition of "consultation," the report stressed that consultation "means that a
decision is pending" and that members "are being asked by the President for their
advice and opinions and, in appropriate circumstances, their approval of action contem-
plated."" Thus, informational briefings in which a fait accompli is presented and the
of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs) [hereinafter StNC. OF HCFA].
9. The War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1541-48 (1982)), § 1541(a), (emphasis added).
10. Id.
11. H.R. REP. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1s( Sess. 6-7 (1973).
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counsel of legislators is not solicited fail to fulfill the law's consultation obligations.
"Meaningful" consultation, the report underscored, requires the full sharing of informa-
tion.
B. Reporting, Congressional Action, and the Sixty-Day Clock
Section 4(a) of the WPR elaborates on the reporting requirements. The President
is enjoined to submit a written report to the Speaker of the House and the President
pro tempore of the Senate within forty-eight hours when "in the absence of a declara-
tion of war" armed forces are sent "(1) into hostilities or into situations where immi-
nent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances; (2) into the
territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat... ; or (3)
in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for com-
bat already located in a foreign nation."' 2 The report must explain the conditions
compelling the use of the military, "the constitutional and legislative authority" under
which the action is occurring, and "the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities
or involvement."'' 3 As long as troops remain in hostile or potentially hostile situations,
periodic reports to Congress must be submitted.
The House underscored in its War Powers bill that it intended to impart broad
meanings to the WPR terms "hostilities" and "imminent hostilities:"
The word hostilities was substituted for the phrase armed conflict during the sub-
committee drafting process because it was considered to be somewhat broader in
scope. In addition to a situation in which fighting actually has begun, hostilities
also encompasses a state of confrontation in which no shots have been fired but
where there is a clear and present danger of armed conflict. "Imminent hostilities"
denotes a situation in which there is a clear potential either for such a state of
confrontation or for actual armed conflict.
4
The reporting requirements in § 4(a)(l)-i.e., situations of hostilities or imminent
hostilities-relate to congressional action in § 5. Most notably, the § 4(a)(1) reporting
obligations trigger the time limitation in § 5(b). Section 5(b) stipulates that within sixty
days "after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to § 4(a)(1),"
the President must end deployment of forces unless Congress has declared war, has
authorized the action, has extended the sixty-day period, or cannot convene because of
an attack on the U.S. (The sixty-day period may be lengthened by thirty days if the
President "determines and certifies" to Congress that safe and prompt troop removal
mandates the extension.) Failure to label a report under § 4(a)(1) technically does not
delay or stop the clock-triggering process, because the time limitation takes effect if a
report was, as the WPR states, "required to be submitted pursuant to § 4(a)(1)." In
addition, according to § 5(c), at any point Congress may require that military involve-
ment be terminated by passing a concurrent resolution.'
12. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a).
13. Id.
14. H.R. REP. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973).
15. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (1988). Yet in the aftermath of the Supreme Court decision in the case
of INS v. Chadha 462 U.S. 919 (1983), the validity of this concurrent resolution is uncertain. Thus, in
1983 Congress passed legislation substituting a joint resolution for a concurrent resolution. Although
not amending the WPR, this measure offers procedures that can be invoked if the Supreme Court
strikes down section 5(c).
1995]
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C. Interpretation of WPR
Section 8 addresses the construction, intent, and effect of the WPR by placing
the law within the framework of past and future laws and treaties, as well as the Con-
stitution. Several provisions within § 8 pertain to this research. Section 8(a) insures
that authority to introduce troops cannot be inferred from anything other than explicit
authorization; past and future laws (including appropriations measures), security trea-
ties, or broadly-worded resolutions are not to be used as authorization for sending
troops into hostilities or situations of imminent hostilities. 6 To underscore this prohi-
bition, § 8(a)(1) provides that no law is to impart congressional authorization unless it
specifically allows for entrance into hostilities and recites that it is so intended. Section
8(a)(2) enacts that no treaty, old or new, can be used to infer authority to go to war
unless such authority is spelled out specifically." In the words of Professor Charles
Black, Jr., § 8(a), as a whole, thus strips
the President bare of any possible justification under law for piecing together, out
of any actions or utterances other than specific statutory authorization of involve-
ment in hostilities-specifically labeled as such-some kind of implied Congressio-
nal consent. Congress has itself prohibited the putting of such words into its own
mouth.l Section 8(b) further highlights the importance of explicit congressional
action by way of a carefully limited exception.'
II. FROM OPERATION DESERT SHIELD TO OPERATION DESERT
STORM: A BRIEF RECAP OF KEY EVENTS
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi troops under President Saddam Hussein's direction
invaded and seized control of Kuwait, and proceeded toward Saudi Arabia. In response
to the incursion, President George Bush issued executive orders freezing Iraqi and
Kuwaiti assets in the U.S., and banning trade and transactions with, and travel to, Iraq.
In addition, before departing for the August recess (August 4), the House and Senate
each passed separate pieces of legislation essentially supporting the President's execu-
tive orders; neither of these measures, however, became law.'0
The flurry of activity continued throughout August. From August 2-7 Bush con-
sulted with over a dozen foreign leaders." Then on August 7 Bush decided to inter-
vene in the Gulf. He and his aides called congressional leaders on August 8 to inform
Congress of the impending action; a few hours later he addressed the nation. The next
day, Bush reported to Congress "consistent with" the WPR that he had deployed U.S.
troops "to deter Iraqi aggression and to preserve the integrity of Saudi Arabia."" He
16. JoHN H. ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS
AFTERMATH 128-30 (1993).
17. 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a).
18. U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 275 (1990) [hereinafter SCFR Gulf Hearings].
19. See id. at 276.
20. On August 2, 1990, the Senate passed S. Res. 318, 136 CONG. REC. S11896-907 (daily ed.
Aug. 2, 1990). The same day, the House passed H.R. 5431. Id. at H6288-321.
21. ROURKE, supra note 4, at 23. See also President's Message to the Nation Announcing the
Deployment of United States Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia, 26 WKLY. CoMp. PREs. Doc. 1216 (Aug.
8, 1990).
22. Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate on the De-
ployment of United States Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia and the Middle East, 26 WKLY. COMP.
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wrote, "I do not believe involvement in hostilities is imminent."23 Bush's first extend-
ed discussion with congressional leaders occurred on August 15. Also in August, at
the administration's urging, the United Nations imposed economic sanctions against
Iraq.
In October 1990 both bodies passed separate legislation supporting the U.S. troop
deployment; again, neither measure became law. The House approved H.J. Res. 658,
backing Bush's actions up to that point, citing some WPR requirements, and quoting
Bush's declaration that involvement in hostilities was not imminent.' The Senate-ap-
proved measure, S. Con. Res. 147, also stated support for Bush's actions. The Senate
resolution did not mention the WPR, although senators did discuss it in the surround-
ing debate.2"
Also in October 1990, the congressional leadership designated a joint bipartisan
group of members to be available for consultation on Gulf developments during ad-
journment. 7 Bush met with the consultation group on October 30-the day he decid-
ed to double the number of troops in the region 2 t-but he did not mention the upcom-
ing buildup. On November 8 (after the 1990 elections), Bush ordered an additional
150,000-200,000 troops to the Gulf to insure "an adequate offensive military op-
tion."'29 He officially informed the consultation group of this decision on November
14. Two days later, Bush sent Congress a report describing the deployment; the report
restated that hostilities were not imminent, without citing the WPR.'
Later in November, at the administration's encouragement, the U.N. Security
Council passed Security Council Resolution 678. This measure authorized member
states to use "all necessary means" to implement the Security Council's resolutions and
restore peace and security in the area, unless Iraq complied with the U.N. resolutions
by January 15, 1991.3 Administration officials claimed at that time Bush did not need
congressional authorization to use force to implement the U.N. resolutions. Many
members, however, disagreed. In response to the events, some members called for
reconvening Congress in December 1990 to debate issues surrounding the use of force.
Instead of reconvening, committees in both bodies held hearings.
After the 102d Congress commenced, the leadership announced that debate on
the Gulf situation would begin on January 10. Two days before that date and a week
before the January 15 U.N. deadline-on January 8-Bush requested a congressional
resolution supporting "the use of all necessary means to implement U.N. Security
Council Resolution 678. "32 Bush's letter did not mention the WPR; Bush stated that
PRES. Doc. 1225-26 (Aug. 9, 1990).
23. Id.
24. RoURKE, supra note 4, at 23.
25. 136 CONG. REc. H8441-55, H8549-50 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1990).
26. 136 CONG. REc. S14192-98 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1990) (statements of former Sen. Adams, Sen.
Hatfield, Sen. Pell).
27. E. Collier, The War Powers Resolution: 18 Years Of Experience, Prepared For The Congres-
sional Research Service, 92-133F, 27-28 (1992).
28. Lally Weymouth, How Bush Went to War, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 1991, at Bl.
29. President's Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate
on the Deployment of Additional United States Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia, 26 WKLY. COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1834 (Nov. 16, 1990) [hereinafter President's Letter on Additional Deployment].
30. Id.
31. S.C. Res. 678, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/678 (1990). See INDEX TO PROCEED-
INGS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, 45th Sess., at 111, U.N. Doc. STILIB/SER.B/S.27 (1990).
32. Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Persian Gulf Crisis, 27 WKLY. COMp. PRES. Doc. 17,
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he simply was asking Congress to "join" with and "express its support" for him "at
this critical time. 33
On January 12, Congress responded to Bush's letter with legislation. After de-
feating resolutions calling for continued reliance on economic sanctions, both houses
passed separate resolutions authorizing the use of force pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 678; the Senate subsequently passed the House version, H.J. Res. 77, now
P.L. 102-1. Under P.L. 102-1, before exercising such force, the President was to
report to Congress his determination that the U.S. had exhausted all peaceful means to
obtain Iraqi compliance with Security Council resolutions, and that those efforts had
not been and would not be successful. In terms of the WPR, P.L. 102-1 stated that,
"consistent with" § 8(a)(1) in the WPR, the law constitutes "specific statutory authori-
zation within the meaning of [the WPR's] section 5(b)."35 P.L. 102-1 also noted that
it did not supersede any WPR requirement. Along the lines of the WPR, the law re-
quired presidential reports to Congress at specific intervals. Notwithstanding these
provisions, as he signed H.J. Res. 77, Bush underscored that his position had not
changed on the WPR's unconstitutionality.36
III. THE NEXUS BETWEEN THE WPR'S PROVISIONS, AND THE
ACTIONS AND DECISIONS ON U.S. PERSIAN GULF POLICY
In the following sections, I examine executive compliance with the WPR's letter
and intent throughout the Gulf crisis, and the congressional response to the
administration's actions. On the surface, the WPR's failure to meet its sponsors' main
(stated) objective stands out-this failure appears by looking at compliance with the
procedures intended to help insure collective judgment. More specifically, meaningful
consultation neither occurred nor was demanded; a report under § 4(a)(1) was neither
filed nor seriously solicited; and the 60-day time limitation was neither triggered by the
executive nor invoked independently by Congress. In addition, the § 8(a) provisions
regarding the necessity of explicit congressional authorizations were neither heeded by
the administration nor emphasized in Congress.
A. Consultation
1. Presidential Action
The Bush administration did not initiate meaningful consultation with members
of Congress on events in the Persian Gulf. Indeed, members' advice and opinions were
never sought when decisions were pending. Three examples of key administration
decisions capture the nature of the discussions that occurred throughout the period, and
illustrate as well the administration's views on consultation and executive consultation
18 (Jan. 8, 1991) [hereinafter Letter to Congressional Leaders].
33. Id.
34. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No. 102-1, 105 Stat.
3 (1991). The House also adopted H.R. Con. Res. 32, expressing the sense of Congress that any of-
fensive military actions against Iraq must be approved by Congress. 137 CONG. REc. H390-405 (daily
ed. Jan. 12, 1991). The Senate did not act on this resolution.
35. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No. 102-1, 105 Stat.
3 (1991).
36. Statement on Signing the Resolution Authorizing the Use of Military Force Against Iraq, 27




First, in August 1990, Bush did not consult with Congress in the five days be-
tween the August 2 Iraqi invasion and the final determination to intervene militarily;
instead, information simply was transmitted to a few congressional leaders just before
Bush's August 8 national television address.3' Throughout these five critical days of
decision-making when the administration failed to seek Congress's input, the adminis-
tration did confer with foreign leaders. Bush made twenty-three telephone calls to
twelve foreign leaders, flew to Colorado to consult with British Prime Minister Marga-
ret Thatcher, assigned Secretary of State James Baker to confer with his counterparts
abroad, sent Defense Secretary Richard Cheney to Saudi Arabia to negotiate with King
Fahd, and then dispatched Cheney to confer with other key foreign officials.3" Ulti-
mately, Bush alone authorized the troop deployment following Cheney's meeting with
Fahd.39
Despite the administration's lack of consultation in August, some of Bush's
advisers nevertheless complained at the time about consultation obligations. For in-
stance, one aide complained, "It'll be easier to get the U.N. to agree than Congress."'
Therefore, another aide explained, "It's true we've promised to consult Congress if
there's a war. In other words, we'll phone them just after the first bombs have been
dropped."'"
Second, the President did not consult with Congress on the decisions to double
the number of troops in November 1990 and simultaneously alter the U.S. strategy
"from defense and containment to offense and rollback by force."42 Bush again con-
sulted foreign leaders about this matter.43 Bush, however, did not even mention it to
the official congressional consultative group during a meeting with the key legislators
on the day he made the determination, October 30. Rather, he simply began notifying
congressional leaders informally of his decisions over a week later (on the day he
ordered the additional troop deployment), calling Senator Sam Nunn, then Chair of the
37. The WPR requires the president to consult with "the Congress." Bush, however, chose to
inform only a limited number of key legislators. Despite the law's wording, such practice has become
common. Note also that since Bush claimed that hostilities were not imminent, as discussed below
(infra note 59 and accompanying text), he might have claimed that the lack of imminent hostilities
rendered consultation under the WPR unnecessary. He did not, though, appear to explicitly make the
linkage between the perceived lack of imminent hostilities and his actions regarding the consultation
requirements.
38. ROURKE, supra note 4, at 23. Bush also reviewed the extent of his administration's talks with
foreign leaders, as well as mentioning forthcoming discussions, in his August 8 national address:
President's Message to the Nation Announcing the Deployment of United States Armed Forces to
Saudi Arabia, supra note 21.
39. P. SALINGER & E. LAURENT, SECRET DOSSIER: THE HIDDEN AGENDA BEHIND THE GULF
WAR (1991); Weymouth, supra note 28. And even before the Cheney-Fahd talks, according to an ad-
ministration official, "there was a conclusion that we needed to put a defensive posture into Saudi
Arabia to let Saddam know that an attack against Saudi Arabia was an attack against the U.S."
Devroy & Balz, For Bush, Moment of Decision "Came Saturday at Camp David, WASH. POST, Aug. 9,
1990, at A31.
Glennon writes that Bush's commitment to Saudi Arabia was "made as a sole executive agree-
ment-an agreement more sweeping in its terms than any of the seven mutual security treaties to
which the United States is party, for none of those contains an ironclad commitment to go to war."
Glennon, supra note 3, at 85.
40. P. SALINGER & E. LAURENT, supra note 39, at 176.
41. Id.
42. 137 Cong. Rec. 5335 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1991) (statement of Sen. Gore).
43. President's Letter on Additional Deployment, supra note 29.
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Senate Armed Services Committee, for example, and saying, "We are switching from a
policy of defensive and blockade to a policy of offensive and invasion." Bush then
officially informed the consultation group of his actions on November 14.
Third, the administration did not consult with Congress on its choice to seek a
U.N. Security Council Resolution authorizing member states to use "all necessary
means" against Iraq after a certain date unless Iraq complied with the U.N. resolu-
tions.45 Bush explained his actions and the absence of consultation at a news confer-
ence soon after the November 29th passage of Security Council Resolution 678: "I
cannot consult with 535 strong-willed individuals. I can't do it, nor does my responsi-
bility under the Constitution compel me to do that." Yet this lack of consultation
occurred even though the requested Security Council Resolution and deadline would
set in motion developments affecting U.S. forces and their involvement in hostilities.
Note also that the congressional consultation group was intended to facilitate consulta-
tion on just such an issue.
2. Congressional Response and Action
Despite the absence of meaningful consultation, members generally gave the
administration high marks for keeping Congress informed of executive decisions before
the troop doubling in November. 7 On October 1, 1990, the House even passed H.J.
Res. 658, which stated that Bush "has consulted with the Congress and has kept the
Congress informed with regard to the [troop] deployment" in the Gulf." Notwithstand-
ing widespread support for the administration's informational briefings, some members
of Congress were concerned about actions that might be taken by the administration
during the October 1990 to January 1991 adjournment. These concerns prompted the
congressional leadership to establish a formal congressional consultative mechanism
for use during that period.49
It was not until November 1990 when Bush doubled the number of troops in the
Gulf and changed the mission's orientation without consulting the congressional con-
sultative group, though, that many members began vocally expressing concerns about
the absence of meaningful consultation. Senator Nunn explained, "When the announce-
ment was made that there was going to be another buildup of forces that was going to
44. 137 CoNG. REc. S328 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
45. The U.S. originally sought a January 1, 1991 deadline, but agreed to a January 15, 1991
deadline in U.N. Security Council Resolution 678. John Goshko, U.S. Gains Backing for Use of Force,
WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 1990, at Al.
46. George F. Seib, Secret Diplomacy May Become Pitfall for President Bush, WALL ST. J., Dec.
3, 1990, at AI0. Note, though, that Bush was mistaken-his constitutional responsibility is to "take
care that the laws be faithfully executed," regardless of personal preferences. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 3.
47. Crisis in the Persian Gulf., Hearings Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23 (1990) [hereinafter HCFA Gulf Hearings]; Crisis in the Persian Gulf U.S. Poli-
cy Options and Implications: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 111 (1990).
48. See H.J. Res. 658, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. H8441-42. (daily ed. Oct. 1,
1990).
49. In House and Senate hearings Secretary Baker opposed the formation of a consultation group
as unnecessary, insisting that the ad hoc consultative procedures (under which the administration kept
Congress "informed") were adequate. HCFA Gulf Hearings, supra note 47; SCFR Gulf Hearings, supra
note 18. Soon after Baker's testimony, a journalist mused that Baker "probably [had] spent more time
discussing the Gulf crisis face to face with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze than with
any congressional leader." Seib, supra note 46.
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have an offensive mission and there was no consultation prior to that, that was when a
lot of people-including myself-started asking questions."'  Nunn further noted, "I
was informed. I was not consulted .... There is a big difference between being in-
formed after a decision has already been made and getting your views [heard] before
one is made."'" A longtime Bush friend and supporter, former Representative (and
ranking minority member on the House Foreign Affairs Committee) William
Broomfield, "angrily charged that the administration's failure to consult more closely
with key lawmakers 'is the main reason support for the policy is eroding.'
52
Although congressional discontent increased in November, Congress did not
demand that the President seek the advice and opinions of members when any subse-
quent decisions were pending. Neither the House nor the Senate took any legally-bind-
ing legislative action to try to force Bush to comply with the letter and spirit of the § 3
consultation provisions. The only quasi-attempt to mandate consultation emerged in the
form of a lawsuit, Dellums v. Bush: 3 on November 20, 1990, Representative Ronald
Dellums, and forty-four other members of Congress, filed court action to block an
offensive presidential move in the Persian Gulf unless the President had consulted
with, as well as received authorization from, the Congress.' In this-instance, however,
members based their suit on the Constitution, not the WPR.55
3. Summary Comments On Compliance with Section Three
The Bush administration's circumvention of its obligation to consult with Con-
gress, and the subdued congressional response to the administration's interpretation of
the law, highlights the WPR's failure to achieve its sponsors' goals regarding consulta-
tion. The 1973 House report's clarifying language notwithstanding, the executive
branch simply informed members of its decisions and credited itself for "diligently"
consulting.56 Yet true consultation-in the spirit in which § 3 intended-did not char-
acterize Bush's meetings with and briefings for Congress; members' advice and opin-
ions could never influence executive actions since decisions were never pending when
notification occurred. Despite this pattern of executive noncompliance, Congress did
not demand faithful execution of the consultation provisions.
Might the exigencies of the moment have prevented consultation? The WPR,
indeed, provides a caveat, requiring consultation only "in every possible instance." In
50. Seib & Rogers, Congress Presses Bush for Voice in Gulf Policy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14,
1990, at All (emphasis added). Of course, one can argue that the "questions" and congressional in-
volvement should have come at the very beginning while decisions were being made, according to the
WPR, not three months into a major troop deployment.
51. Id.
52. Carroll J. Doherty, Uncertain Congress Confronts President's Gulf Strategy, 48 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 3879, 3880 (1990).
53. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
54. Id. In the case, Judge Harold Greene of the United States District Court refused to enter an
injunction on a "ripeness" ground. Nonetheless, he "issued a powerful opinion indicating that if Presi-
dent Bush went ahead with the war without congressional authorization he would be violating the
Constitution (which opinion thus was effectively a nonappealable declaratory judgment, and had pre-
cisely the effect the challengers had been hoping for)." ELY, supra note 16, at 50.
55. Dellums pursued the constitutional angle because of a belief that the WPR was not an effec-
tive law or device for seeking an injunction against the president. Interview with top level congressio-
nal aide, Washington, D.C. (July 1992).




this case, though, the exception to the consultation requirement was inapplicable: ad-
ministration officials invariably had sufficient time to consult with Congress on key
decisions. The initial August 1990 determination to deploy troops exemplifies this
phenomenon. If the President and his top officials could place calls around the world
and travel domestically as well as abroad to consult with foreign leaders, the mile plus
up Pennsylvania Avenue to Capitol Hill should not have presented an insurmountable
obstacle to consultation." The exigencies of the moment also did not preclude consul-
tation in October and November-the President again had ample time to confer with
foreign leaders. The lack of meaningful consultation thus cannot be attributed to the
"in every possible instance" caveat. Instead, the Bush administration just chose to
follow precedent and construe the § 3 consultation requirements narrowly. Further-
more, Congress failed to demand more faithful compliance with the law's letter and
intent.
B. Presidential Reporting, the Sixty-Day Clock, and Related Congressional
Action
1. Presidential Action
President Bush submitted three War Powers reports to Congress regarding the
Gulf troop deployment. On August 9, Bush reported "consistent with" the WPR that he
had deployed U.S. forces, thus following tradition by using the "consistent with" word-
ing." Unlike previous Presidents' reports, however, his first report explicitly claimed
that hostilities were not imminent. In so doing, the administration perhaps sought to
quell any discussion regarding a filing pursuant to § 4(a)(1) and the triggering of the
sixty-day clock.59 The second report to Congress, describing the continuing and in-
creasing deployment of forces, arrived on November 16, eight days after Bush doubled
the number of troops in the Gulf. (This letter did not meet the forty-eight hour report-
ing requirement in § 4(a).) In the letter Bush reiterated his August 9 statements that
imminent hostilities were absent and that "the deployment would facilitate a peaceful
resolution of the crisis."' Bush filed the third report on January 18, 1991, "consistent
with" the WPR; he stated in the report that he had directed U.S. troops "to commence
combat operations on January 16. ''61 (Since P.L. 102-1 provided the specific authori-
zation for the use of force within the meaning of § 5(b) of the WPR, no further presi-
dential action was required at the time under the WPR.)
62
Despite Bush's wording in the first two reports, the question of whether troops
were sent into hostilities or a situation of imminent hostilities, and thus whether a
57. Not only was it feasible to consult with Congress, but such discussions probably would have
achieved the administration's desired results-recall that each house adopted a separate measure con-
demning the August 2 Iraqi invasion on the very day it occurred. See supra note 20 and accompany-
ing text.
58. Eileen Burgin, Congress, The War Powers Resolution, and the Invasion of Panama, 25 POLI-
TY 217, 222 (1992).
59. Telephone interview with senior Bush administration official (April 25, 1994).
60. President's Letter on Additional Deployment, supra note 29.
61. Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Persian Gulf Conflict, 27 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC.
59 (Jan. 18, 1991).
62. And even without P.L. 102-1, the administration had contended that it would not recognize




report was required to be submitted pursuant to § 4(a)(1), remains open. Let us exam-
ine the facts as presented by the administration. The day before claiming in his first
WPR report that hostilities were not imminent, Bush said, "Iraq has massed an enor-
mous war machine on the Saudi border, capable of initiating hostilities with little or no
additional preparation. '63 And on September 16, Bush told the Iraqi people that the
two nations were "on the brink of war."' On September 20, Bush requested that the
U.S. forces in the Gulf receive imminent danger pay. And soon afterward, Cheney
warned that Hussein "may seek to use military force to break the stranglehold that the
embargo has imposed."' Furthermore, upon submitting his second WPR report, Bush
concomitantly raised the specter of an offensive military initiative: "The deployment
will ensure that the coalition has an adequate offensive military option should that be
necessary."' The very words and deeds of the Bush administration thus cast serious
doubt on its claim that troops were not "in imminent danger of hostilities."
In addition to the three formal war powers reports, one other written communica-
tion merits discussion here: Bush sent Congress a letter on January 8, 1991, seeking a
congressional resolution supporting the U.N. Security Council actions. Bush asked
Congress in the letter to "express its support for the President at this critical time."'67
The letter included a somewhat veiled warning that if Congress failed to pass an au-
thorization Bush would proceed nonetheless: he wrote, "I am determined to do whatev-
er is necessary to protect America's security." ' In discussing the letter with reporters,
Bush explained his belief that authorization was not a prerequisite for presidential
action: "I don't think I need it ... I feel that I have the authority to fully implement
the United Nations resolutions."'69 And according to a key administration official,
"Even if Congress had failed to back the president [in January], Bush planned to send
American forces into combat... if Saddam didn't pull out. The U.S. troops would
have operated under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter ...... , Hence, these administra-
tion statements (both written and verbal) in January, 1991, further underscore that the
President did not accept the spirit of the § 4(a)(1) reporting requirements applicable in
situations of hostilities and imminent hostilities.
2. Congressional Response and Action
Congress did not pass legally-binding legislation to force compliance with the
reporting requirements when the Bush administration misconstrued the language re-
garding reporting and finessed its reporting obligations to avoid the sixty-day clock.
Although members introduced legislation pertaining to both the application and circum-
vention of the WPR reporting requirements, Congress did not address Bush's disregard
for the law in a timely and decisive fashion-in a manner conforming to the intent of
the WPR's sponsors---on any WPR measure during the critical months before January,
63. Nightline, supra note 5.
64. Glennon, supra note 3, at 100.
65. 136 CONG. REC. S14311 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990) (statement of Sen. Cohen).
66. President's Letter on Additional Deployment, supra note 29.
67. Letter to Congressional Leaders, supra note 32.
68. Id.
69. L. Fisher, Paper presented at a Center for National Security Studies Conference on Constitu-
tional Government and Military Intervention after the Cold War, 20-21 (1992).
70. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter authorizes any U.N. member (e.g., Kuwait), to use its own
force in self-defense and to ask for others' assistance. Weymouth, supra note 28.
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1991. A review of congressional actions, as well as individual members' actions and
statements, illustrates the overall nature of Congress's response.
In August, 1990, Congress had the option of triggering the sixty-day clock. Giv-
en the Bush administration's statements regarding the distinct possibility of hostilities,
Congress could have challenged Bush's characterization of the situation in his August
letter-that hostilities were not imminent-and invoked § 4(a)(1) to start the clock.
The WPR states that the time limitation takes effect if a report was "required to be
submitted pursuant to § 4(a)(1)." Yet members long have embraced the incorrect exec-
utive argument that without unambiguous presidential language about filing pursuant to
§ 4(a)(l), the time limitation is not categorically triggered.7 ' Thus, Congress took no
action to start the clock.
Similarly, in September and October, although members in both bodies had sug-
gested invoking the law to put Congress on record for or against Bush's policy,"' this
did not occur. Instead, in early October the House and Senate each passed separate
measures, neither of which demanded faithful execution of the law. The Senate concur-
rent resolution did not even mention the WPR. (See supra p. 27, first full paragraph.)
This failure to incorporate members' WPR concerns into the resolution prompted Sena-
tor Mark Hatfield to ask his colleagues, "Why, why do we avoid our responsibilities
that we defined for ourselves and passed, in spite of a President's veto, into law?"73
The House measure, in contrast, cited the WPR, but did not declare that § 4(a)(1) had
become operative. Furthermore, the House acquiesced to the extent of quoting Bush's
statement that involvement in hostilities was not imminent: H.J. Res. 658 stated that,
consistent with the § 4(a)(1) requirement, Bush declared in his August 9 report that he
believed involvement in hostilities was not imminent.74 This legislative response pro-
voked Representative DeFazio's quip: "our" troops, sailors, allies, and constituents all
think hostilities are imminent, but "only here in ... Congress and.., at the White
House do we try to ignore the reality of the Persian Gulf confrontation.""5 former
Representative Larry Hopkins, a WPR opponent and a Bush supporter, even voiced the
following complaint on the House floor:
Today's resolution proposes to enshrine this arrangement of mutual convenience
between the Congress and the White House that holds that whenever the issue
comes up "we will both agree to look the other way on War Powers.". . . I find
the [resolution's] provisions which assert that the War Powers issue has been prop-
erly addressed to be self-serving delusion and a gross evasion of responsibility.76
DeFazio echoed this sentiment: "The President has once again failed to properly com-
ply with the law, and Congress has offered him its congratulations.""
After the November doubling of troops in the Gulf region, almost all members
71. The Constitutional Roles of Congress and the President in Declaring and Waging War: Hear-
ings Before the Senate Comm on Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 203-04 (1991) [hereinafter Senate
Judiciary Hearings]; See also Burgin, supra note 58; A. Rubner, The Reagan Administration, the 1973
War Powers Resolution, and the Invasion of Grenada, 100 POL. SCL Q. 636 (1985/86).
72. Christopher Madison, Sideline Players, 22 NAT'L J. 3024, 3026 (1990).
73. 136 CONG. REc. S14196 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1990).
74. See H.J. Res. 658, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H8441-42. (daily ed. Oct. 1,
1990).
75. 136 CONG. REc. H8450 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1990).
76. Id. at H8453.
77. Id. at H8454.
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appeared to think that the prospect of war had increased; Congress did not, however,
explicitly express the view that the clock had started. Although Congress was in recess
at the time, the leadership could have asked Bush to reconvene Congress for a special
session so that such legislative action could be taken."8 But Congress did not recon-
vene, and hence no legislative action was taken.
In fact, it was not until January 1991 that members mustered the requisite will
and forged the necessary consensus to pass a measure in identical form by both bodies
regarding the WPR. By that time, however, the sixty-day WPR cutoff had come and
gone almost three times, the U.S. had committed nearly a half-million troops, U.N.
resolutions had been passed at the Bush administration's urging, and America's pres-
tige and Bush's personal credibility were fully engaged. And while the congressional
resolution nominally met WPR requirements-as explicit authorization under the 1973
law-the commitment to go to war was made much earlier without the requisite con-
gressional participation. Former Senator John Heinz, who supported the authorization
to use force, lamented nonetheless:
I believe that it is unfortunate that we shirked that [War Powers] responsibility for
months. There is more than enough blame to go around: we in the Congress want-
ed to play a waiting game, and the President supported that game, since it provided
him with the latitude he needed and wanted in dealing with the United Nations and
Iraq. 9
The waiting game also may have left Congress with little choice of what to do. As a
trusted Baker confidant queried, "How could our Congress not support something that
Ethiopia was supporting? That the Soviet Union was supporting?"'
3. Summary Comments On Compliance with Sections Four and Five
Senator William Cohen argued in the fall of 1990, "It seems to me that this
extraordinary commitment of U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf, which clearly has the
potential to involve the United States in hostilities, is precisely the sort of situation
envisioned when the War Powers Resolution was enacted."'" And Senator Hatfield
was even more specific about the applicability of §§ 4(a)(1) and 5 in stating that
"[w]hen Bush said the troops were not in imminent danger, he misrepresented the
reality of the case."82 Despite the apparent accuracy of these two assessments about
the relevance of §§ 4 and 5, both branches, by and large, ignored the letter and spirit
of the sections. More specifically, the administration misconstrued the language regard-
ing reporting and finessed the reporting requirements so that it could claim the sixty-
day clock did not commence. And Congress passed no legislation in response to the
executive's actions regarding reporting and the sixty-day clock. Indeed, it was January
of 1991 before both bodies passed any identical measure dealing with the WPR, and
that measure essentially disregarded the sixty-day clock as well by providing specific
statutory authorization under § 5(b).
It is also interesting to note the relative lack of committee attention that §§ 4 and
78. Doherty, supra note 52, at 3879.
79. 137 CONG. REC. S313 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 1991).
80. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., TRIUMPH WITHoUT VICrORY 198-99 (1992).
81. 136 CONG. REc. S14311 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990).
82. Telephone interview with Sen. Mark Hatfield (Sept. 13, 1993).
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5 of the WPR received in this crisis. Previous military maneuvers sometimes prompted
hearings specifically addressing the WPR and presidential adherence to it.83 In con-
trast, no committee organized such a hearing regarding U.S. policy in the Gulf. Cer-
tainly, in several House and Senate committee hearings, members focused considerable
attention on the law, but no hearing devoted itself solely to the nexus between the
WPR and the Gulf crisis. When the Judiciary Committee decided to examine U.S.
policy within a more legalistic framework in a January 8, 1991 hearing, it explored the
scope of Congress's constitutional war powers, rather than focusing on the WPR and
its applicability to the imminent hostilities in the Gulf.U
C. Section Eight
1. Presidential Action
Based on the Bush administration's actions and statements, one might assume
that § 8 did not exist. The administration intimated that in appropriations and other
measures Congress already had given its implied consent to enter hostilities.85 Implied
consent, however, is insufficient; in theory, in § 8 Congress a priori had invalidated
Bush's arguments about not needing specific congressional authorization before attack-
ing Iraq. Furthermore, § 8(a) illustrates that the administration's more explicit rationale
for not needing congressional authorization-that Bush had "the authority to fully
implement the United Nations Resolutions"-also was inaccurate." Section 8(a) en-
acts the proposition that laws, treaties, or broadly-worded resolutions cannot be used as
authorization for introducing troops into hostilities or situations of imminent hostilities.
2. Congressional Response and Action
Notwithstanding the Bush administration's selective disregard for § 8, Congress
did not emphasize the existence and meaning of the § 8 provisions. Congressional
discussion of the executive's misinterpretation of the law in this regard appears limited
to committee hearings.
D. Summary Assessment
A review of Bush's compliance record with the WPR in the Gulf crisis and the
congressional response to the administration's interpretation of the law certainly high-
lights the WPR's failure to achieve its sponsors' goals. Meaningful consultation neither
occurred nor was demanded; a report under § 4(a)(1) was neither filed nor seriously
solicited; the sixty-day time limitation was neither triggered nor invoked independently
by Congress; and the § 8(a) provisions were neither heeded by the administration nor
83. Burgin, supra note 58.
84. Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 71.
85. See, e.g., SCFR Gulf Hearings, supra note 18, at 120-26.
86. Fisher, supra note 69, at 21. Yet some controversy exists over this point. See, e.g., Thomas
M. Franck & Faiza Patel, The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign Relations Law: UN Police
Action in Lieu of War: "The Old Order Changeth", 85 AM. J. Irr'L L. 63 (1991); John M.
Hillebrecht, In U.S., Constitution Supersedes U.N. Charter, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1990, at A22; Thom-
as M. Franck, Declare War? Congress Can't, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1990, at A27.
Also note that U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 did not obligate the U.S. to employ
force-it was permissive in nature, merely authorizing the use of "all necessary means." U.N. SCOR
678, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990).
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emphasized by members of Congress. Thus, not only did the administration circumvent
the law, but Congress also acquiesced by failing to use the WPR to its fullest poten-
tial.87
IV. STILL A FACTOR: THE IMPACT OF THE WPR ON
CGNGKESSIGN A. CT."ION '' ,,1k.1 P1ERS . GUTY. v F
Former Representative Dante Fascell, Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee from 1984-1992, claimed that congressional action in the Gulf crisis indicated
that the WPR "is alive and well." 8 Based on the intentions of the WPR's sponsors,
and the decision making surrounding the troop deployment and war in the Gulf, we
have seen that the characterization of the WPR as "alive and well" is quite a stretch.
Although the WPR is not achieving its authors' goals and hence is not technically
"alive and well," in this section I show the partial truth in Fascell's statement-the
WPR still may be a factor affecting the procedure and symbolism surrounding congres-
sional action. Indeed, the law appeared to loom in the background throughout the
crisis, with countless members raising the WPR in legislative proposals, hearings, and
floor speeches. And when Congress authorized the use of force in January 1991, it did
so under the WPR. Even though Congress (just like the administration) did not begin
to adhere to the law's guidelines, and even though the WPR did not affect the sub-
stance or orientation of U.S. policy in this case, many members nevertheless indicated
implicitly that they perceived the WPR to be anything but a "dead letter." In a subse-
quent instance of military involvement a law such as this theoretically may, of course,
directly or indirectly alter the substance of U.S. policy as well.
Thus, to examine whether the WPR in fact exerted any influence on congressio-
nal action in the Gulf crisis, in this section I move beyond an analysis of events alone.
Through direct discussions with members and their aides, I obtained insight into anoth-
er dimension of the WPR question-the views of the legislative actors themselves on
the WPR's possible impact on Congress. If the congressional players who must employ
the WPR believe that the law affects their institution, that information demands consid-
eration. And to gain an outside perspective on and an assessment of legislative actors'
statements about the nexus between the WPR and Congress's actions, I further inter-
viewed senior Bush administration officials.
A. The Sample and the Interviews
In this research I used several different types of interviews. First, 365 structured
telephone interviews with members' staff people responsible for the Persian Gulf issue
were conducted: 288 in the House and seventy-seven in the Senate. I generated the
sample by having an interviewer telephone every congressional office several times in
the summer of 1991; the interviewer tried to reach the staff person directly involved
87. Several obstacles to demanding faithful execution of the law merit acknowledgment. Congress
left for its August recess soon after Iraq invaded Kuwait; thus, members were not in Washington, D.C.
when Bush announced his decision to deploy troops. And when Congress reconvened, it (along with
the nation) focused on the controversial budget talks.. Furthermore, the efforts made by members to
invoke the WPR were opposed by House and Senate leaders, "who consider[ed] the resolution unwork-
able." Madison, supra note 72.
. 88. Statement on War Powers by former Rep. Fascell (Jan. 22, 1991), reprinted in SUBC. OF
HCFA, supra note 8, at 133.
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with the Gulf issue to ask him or her to participate in this study. 9 The interviewer
first telephoned all congressional offices once, making call-backs as suggested by
either the appropriate congressional aide or the office receptionist. She then repeated
this procedure several times. Hence, each of the 535 members of Congress had a
chance of being included in the sample. Staffers were, by and large, receptive to the
calls-less than a dozen aides refused to participate in the study. The sample includes
365 members rather than over 500 members, not because of a high refusal rate, but
rather because of the time-consuming nature and difficulty of contacting appropriate
aides to interview. (As illustrated in Appendix A, the selection process yielded a sam-
ple that reflects Congress's diversity.)
I chose to interview significant numbers of congressional aides, not only because
staffers are relatively more accessible than members, but also because interviewing
staffers is an appropriate research method for studying members' views on an issue.
Certainly, some may argue that staff responses provide an indirect and thus imperfect
measure. Nonetheless, previous studies demonstrate that congressional aides offer
reliable information.' The interviewer also guaranteed total anonymity to staffers and
their bosses to further encourage frank replies. Furthermore, to confirm the accuracy of
staff responses I conducted interviews with eight members; in all cases the staffers'
answers about their perceptions of their bosses' thoughts perfectly reflected the
members' views. The correlation is not surprising: staff people see one of their respon-
sibilities as comprehending their bosses' decisions and thought processes. And consid-
ering the importance, salience, and historic nature of the Gulf issue, congressional
aides both understood and remembered the specifics surrounding their bosses' thoughts
here.
This paper uses data from three "yes/no" questions that were posed to staffers:
(1) Do you think that the WPR had any effect on congressional action in the Persian
Gulf crisis? (2) Do you think that your boss thinks that the WPR had any effect on
congressional action in this case? (3) Did your boss ever mention the WPR to you
when you were discussing the crisis? The answers to these questions were coded 0 for
"no" and 1 for "yes."
To flesh out the information gathered from the telephone interviews, I conducted
several in-person interviews with key congressional aides in the summers of 1992 and
1993. These interviews actually were more in the nature of open-ended discussions
with aides about the WPR and the Persian Gulf crisis. Again, I provided the staffers
with anonymity for themselves and their bosses.
Next, to confirm the accuracy of staff responses and to obtain members' first-
hand reflections about the WPR, in the summer and fall of 1993 I interviewed mem-
bers who were key actors in the Gulf debate. In all, I spoke with eight (current and
former) legislators, including both Democratic and Republican senators and representa-
tives. I conducted six of the interviews in person, and six of the members agreed to
have the interviews be for attribution. As with the in-person staff interviews, I posed
only open-ended questions. A list of the questions appears in Appendix B. Note that
89. In most cases, the legislative director or a legislative assistant handled the issue; in a limited
number of cases the administrative assistant worked most closely with the member on this matter.
90. Bullock, Motivations for U.S. Congressional Committee Preferences: Freshmen of the 92nd
Congress, I LEGIS. STUD. Q. 201, 202-03 (1976); Burgin, Representatives' Decisions on Participation
in Foreign Policy Issues, 16 LEGis. STUD. Q. 521, 524-25 (1991).
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the first question I posed to members is identical substantively to the second question
to which staffers responded. In all cases the member-staff answers corresponded per-
fectly--congressional aides were correct in their assessments of whether their bosses
thought the WPR had an effect on congressional action in the Persian Gulf case.
Hence, staff responses provide an appropriate mechanism for studying this issue.
Finally, to gain the executive branch's perspective on the relevance of the WPR
for understanding congressional action during the Gulf crisis, I interviewed three senior
Bush administration officials. These interviews took place in the spring of 1994 and
were conducted over the telephone. The former administration officials preferred that I
guarantee their anonymity. I posed the same open-ended questions to the senior offi-
cials as I posed to the members of Congress. The interview questions, thus, appear in
Appendix B.
B. Interview Findings
The WPR's failure to achieve its sponsors' goals, as already described, is not
tantamount in participants' eyes to the WPR's failure to have any impact whatsoever
on congressional action. The results from the extensive staff interviews show that a
majority of those interviewed believed that members perceived the WPR exerting an
effect on congressional action during the Gulf crisis. It thus is fair to say that this
indicates that a majority of members thought that the WPR was a pertinent influence
on Congress. Interviewees' responses also suggest that the influence of the WPR may
be difficult to detect simply by examining technical compliance with the law.
Table 1: Impact of the WPR on Congressional Action in the Persian Gulf Crisis,
1990-1991: Means Test Based on Sample of 365 Members of Congress
Member Data Aide Per- Aide Believed Member
ceived Member Per- Raised WPR
Impact of ceived WPR with Aide
WPR Impact
All cases .68 (351) .61 (316) .63 (349)
Chamber
House .69 (279) .61 (250) .63 (278)
Senate .65 (72) .64 (66) .66 (71)
Party
Democrat .71 (205) .68 (185) .69 (207)




No .72 (146) .69 (130) .72 (148)
Yes .66 (205) .56 (186) .57 (201)
Table 1 includes the mean scores of the three "yes/no" questions staffers an-
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swered regarding the WPR. As seen in the second data column in Table 1, over 60%
of the respondents believed that their bosses saw the WPR as a relevant factor affect-
ing Congress. Over 50% of Republicans even perceived the WPR as affecting congres-
sional action. Consistent with these general findings, over 60% of the respondents said
that their bosses raised the WPR issue with them during the crisis. Considering the
widespread belief that the law influenced congressional action, the legislators' war
powers discussions with their aides are not surprising.
1. A Second Look: The Relevance of the WPR
How, though, did members perceive the WPR as affecting congressional action?
As I discuss in this section, the impact of the WPR appears quite subtle to members
themselves (thus making it particularly hard to discern for outside observers who only
examine the events as they unfolded). The WPR seems to prompt action-just not the
action intended by the law's sponsors. Through several examples I will illustrate this
elusive and sometimes indirect nature of the WPR's influence on congressional action
in the Gulf crisis, as it appeared to the respondents. The first two ways in which the
WPR appeared relevant may relate generally to many situations of troop involvement;
the subsequent three examples, in contrast, relate quite specifically to congressional
action taken in the Gulf crisis. It is important to note at this point that senior Bush
administration officials generally concurred with legislators' assessments of the WPR's
impact; one senior executive official even stated, "We talked about it so much amongst
ourselves because they [members] raised it, and we knew they were talking about
it."
9 l
First, and most broadly, according to some members, the existence of the WPR
facilitated congressional action by providing Congress with a tool to "get in the game,"
thus reinforcing Congress's legitimate role. Representative David Bonior, when House
Majority Whip, explained, "The WPR was an important vehicle for us to exercise our
constitutional mandate .... It gave us a way to jump in to a defense of our constitu-
tional responsibilities."92 And as Dr. Robert Hunter (Director of European Studies at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies) testified, "The great value of the
War Powers Resolution is that it is there. It is an assertion of congressional involve-
ment--even if that assertion is contested."93 Former Representative Matthew McHugh
echoed this sentiment: "The WPR was the framework for the debate that took
place .... It reinforces the argument that Congress has a responsibility to partici-
pate-whether the executive accepts the constitutionality of the WPR or not, it is the
law." Senior Bush administration officials agreed that the WPR "provided a vehicle"
for congressional involvement. As one top official described it,
The WPR is really a congressional instrument, even though it technically is the law
of the land .... I imagine that for congressional Democrats and Republicans, for
91. Telephone Interview with a Senior Bush administration official (Apr. 25, 1994).
92. Interview with David Bonior. former House Majority Whip, Washington, D.C. (July 30, 1993).
93. Review of the War Powers Resolution: Hearings Before the House Armed Services Comm.,
101st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 131 (1989).
94. Interview with former Rep. Matthew McHugh, Washington, D.C. (July 28, 1993). Although in
fact reinforcing Congress's role is unnecessary technically-the Constitution provides a sufficient foun-
dation for congressional action-members' perceptions that their institutional prerogatives need rein-
forcement makes this relevant. Legislators react to their own views of reality, which may not always
correspond completely with most observers' characterizations of reality.
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various reasons, the WPR was a useful hook. They can hang their involvement on
it, whether they are enthusiastic about it or not .... It is seen as more central to
them than to the executive-it is the principal formal vehicle for Congress.95
Second, since the WPR is the law of the land, members may sense that they
should try to adhere to it. (One of the issues in the Gulf crisis was, indeed, respect for
the rule of law.) If Congress ignored the law within the context of the Gulf crisis,
Senator Hatfield quipped, it would be "the embodiment of hypocrisy;" as such, Senator
Cohen wrote, it might "invite not only a contempt for the rule of law but contempt for
Congress itself."'  Senator Nancy Kassebaum essentially agreed with these assess-
ments:
I am not a supporter of the WPR, but it is a law of the land. Since it is, ... we
have got to make sure it works or else some of us would like to see it, of course,
banned. But as long as it is there and as long as it is the law of the land, I think
we have to adhere to itY
Along these lines, another senator argued, "Because the WPR is the law of the land we
couldn't ignore it with any good conscience."9 This sense that members need to
prove respect for the law, perhaps at a minimum by trying to comply with some of the
law's provisions, undoubtedly translates into concrete action. Through concrete action
legislators may indicate that the WPR is applicable and of consequence, and that they
appreciate that fact.
Third, according to key inside players, the existence of the WPR helped to
prompt former congressional leaders Mitchell and Foley in October 1990 to designate
a group of legislators to serve on a joint bipartisan consultation body during adjourn-
ment; if the WPR was not the law of the land, it appears unlikely to some members
that these leaders would have created such a body. Bonior explained, "The leadership
was very sensitive to consultation because of the WPR .... The WPR was very im-
portant in getting the leadership to set up the group.' "9 A senior Bush administration
official agreed that "the leadership probably wouldn't have formed this sort of a group
were it not for the WPR."1 ° Former Chairman Fascell elaborated,
There may not have been any real formal consultation without the WPR .... And
in our meetings with Bush [probably taking place because of the WPR] we asked
him to set up such a consultative group [for use during adjournment] on his own.
We even told the administration to name whoever they wanted to be in the group,
but the administration didn't act .... So the leadership took it on themselves to do
it.101
95. Telephone interview with Senior Bush administration official (Apr. 25, 1994).
96. See, respectively, 136 CONG. REc. S14189, 14196 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1990); William S.
Cohen, Action in the Gulf. Get Congress to Vote Now, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1990, at A22.
97. SCFR Gulf Hearings, supra note 18, at 108.
98. Interview with key senator (Sept. 16, 1993) (anonymity requested). Some may argue that this
"guilty conscience from not adhering to the law" prompted members to say, after the fact, that the
WPR affected congressional action when it actually did not. Little evidence of this theory, however,
exists. The argument was not even made by the senior Bush administration officials with whom I
spoke.
99. Interview with Bonior, supra note 92.
100. Telephone interview with Senior Bush administration official (Apr. 26, 1994).
101. Telephone interview with former Rep. Dante Fascell (Aug. 25, 1993).
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Thus, the WPR requirement for consultation generated an expectation that meaningful
consultations would occur; this expectation evolved into concern over the
administration's actual commitment to adhere to the WPR guidelines, and the concern
over the administration's commitment led to the leadership action.
Fourth, the legislative action taken in January 1991, in the eyes of key partici-
pants, was tied to the WPR's existence as well. Beyond the language and form of the
resolution that Congress passed-granting statutory authorization to use force under §
5(b) of the WPR-the fact that legislative action occurred at all may be linked to the
WPR.r 2 Even Representative DeFazio, a prime WPR critic, admitted, "The reason
we finally had a vote was because of the WPR, defective as the WPR is."' 3 The
WPR affected congressional action here, according to members, by influencing Bush's
actions toward Congress, prompting a congressional response. DeFazio explained the
first level of this interaction: "Bush wouldn't have bothered to come in January for an
authorization if the WPR wasn't on the books."'" Fascell expanded on this point:
The president kept saying in meetings that he could go it alone. But many of us
kept telling him he couldn't, that he needed the support of the American people
and the Congress. If the WPR wasn't there, he might have taken the bit in his own
mouth, a la Johnson, and gone on his own... The fact that we had a dialogue
between the president and the Congress here, and kept telling him this, was impor-
tant. "
McHugh elucidated the next level of this interaction:
Bush wouldn't have sent the [January] letter if the WPR wasn't there, and so there
wouldn't have been a vote. Let's say though that even if the WPR wasn't on the
books, Bush sent the letter. The supporters of Bush would have said, "Let's vote."
People opposed to military action might have said, "Let's not vote. Let's not re-
spond to the letter." In the abstract, they would say, "We don't support military ac-
tion, and he can't act without congressional action, so that is that. And we don't
have to do anything, and then he can't do anything.'
The existence of the WPR, however, forced members opposed to the substance of
Bush's request to agree on the necessity of a vote; as McHugh noted, "The process
reflected a consciousness in Congress of the existence and relevance of the WPR, and
the importance of congressional action."''" Fascell agreed: "The WPR kept Congress
in the act .... Congress could not be silent, and Congress could not speak through
designated leaders only . . . . Even if Congress just rubber stamped presidential ac-
tion, . . . the WPR kept Congress involved.' '""e Thus, although Congress's vote came
at the 11 th hour and executive decisions largely determined the course of events, it is
102. 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (1994).
103. Interview with Rep. Peter DeFazio, Washington, D.C. (July 30, 1993).
104. Id.
105. Interview with Fascell, supra note 101. In addition, as I allude to below (see infra p. 43), it
could be that Bush wanted to try to avoid the possibility of Congress at some later date invoking the
WPR and calling for the withdrawal of troops-by receiving authorization to use force he would most
likely preclude this from happening.
106. Interview with McHugh, supra note 92. It is also interesting to recall that in the pre-WPR
period Congress was not likely to jump in to the fray and exert its constitutional responsibilities in the
area of war-making.
107. d.
108. Interview with Fascell, supra note 101.
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still significant that Bush sought congressional support before going to war and that
Congress passed legislation authorizing the use of force. Both the presidential letter
and the subsequent congressional vote were probably due, in large part, to the WPR.
Finally, and related to the previous point, for some members who supported
Bush's policy and wanted to maintain presidential flexibility, the WPR appeared as a
nuisance requiring shackling; these members believed that they shackled the WPR
through the January 1991 legislative action. Senator John Warner explained,
The WPR is on the books for every member to use as he or she wishes .... It
gives any member a ticket to question the president .... So in [the resolution
authorizing the use of force] we made sure that no member could bring up the
WPR at some point and invoke it."°
A senior Bush administration official echoed this sentiment,
To insure the issue came out right from our perspective, we had to engage Con-
gress. But we began our discussions regarding the January votes from the premise
that we wouldn't go in with a sixty-day clock .... One needed to deal with the
WPR without legitimizing it .... The WPR is an unworkable piece of legisla-
tion.
°10
In other words, the WPR affected congressional action, according to some participants,
because it was a law that needed to be addressed head-on-through legislation-to
preclude potential problems. A law that is a "dead letter" does not demand such atten-
tion, however negative the attention may be.
V. FINAL THOUGHTS: A MORE BALANCED ASSESSMENT
The WPR certainly has failed to achieve its authors' main intentions; the law
does not insure that collective judgment applies to the introduction and continued use
of troops in situations of hostilities or imminent hostilities. Nevertheless, this failure
does not reduce the WPR to a meaningless document, which has no effect on congres-
sional action. Members believe that the WPR affected Congress in several ways in the
Persian Gulf crisis, even if it did not clearly alter the actual substance of U.S. policy.
The WPR's impact is far less direct than the law's sponsors intended under some of
the mechanistic procedures they created, but the impact remains real to participants. In
other words, the WPR still matters.
Broadly speaking, the WPR exerted its greatest effect on congressional action in
the Gulf crisis by furnishing legislators-in several ways that outside observers may
find difficult to detect-with the requisite "push in the behind." The WPR offered
members a vehicle for trying to assert Congress's institutional prerogatives. Along
these lines, the law reinforced Congress's legitimate role to participate, as well as
individual members' responsibilities to participate. In addition, the WPR affected con-
gressional action because it is the law of the land, and as such, some members sensed
a duty to try to adhere to some of its general guidelines.'
Beyond these rather abstract and ambiguous consequences, and also in part be-
109. Interview with Sen. John Warner, Washington, D.C. (July 29, 1993).
110. Telephone interview with Senior Bush administration official (Apr. 25, 1994).
Ill. Although in previous instances of military initiatives the WPR also established a foil for at-
tacking a policy's substance, this factor appeared less important in the Gulf case. On previous cases,
see Burgin, supra note 58.
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cause of them, the WPR affected congressional action in the Persian Gulf crisis in
concrete ways, as well. If the WPR did not exist, the congressional leadership probably
would not have created a joint bipartisan consultation body for presidential use during
the 1990-1991 adjournment. And much more importantly, members believe that with-
out the WPR, Congress would not have taken legislative action in January 1991. Re-
gardless of the reason why or the way in which the WPR affected the January 1991
action, a diverse group of participants widely recognized its impact. As Dr. Lawrence
Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations, and
Logistics in the Reagan administration clearly articulated, "That vote certainly sets a
precedent .... It sure as heck will be pretty hard not to vote from here on in ....
Next time, Congress will have to take a stand. ' ' . And in taking a stand, the possibil-
ity always exists that Congress may alter the substance of U.S. policy.
Indeed, it is easy to downplay, and also to underestimate, the significance of a
law that obviously fails to achieve its stated objectives. It may seem, in fact, to be
somewhat counterintuitive to contend that an act which does not meet its sponsors'
intentions nonetheless remains a relevant factor affecting congressional action. Yet
congressional actors make a strong case that the WPR did just that in the Gulf crisis,
and several senior Bush administration officials do not dispute this general assessment.
Hence, if legislators, congressional staffers, and executive branch officials perceive the
WPR exerting an effect on congressional action, these perceptions should not be
scorned. Insiders' perspectives about Congress's actions are based upon expertise,
unique insights, and informal discussions to which outside observers are not ordinarily
privy. Moreover, because legislators react to their own views of reality, not seemingly
objective observers' characterizations of reality, the legislators' perspectives on the
impact of the WPR may, in some sense, become self-fulfilling prophesies.
In sum, criticizing the WPR as a failure, after examining President Bush's cir-
cumvention of its provisions in the Gulf crisis and Congress's inability to try to force
faithful compliance during that period, is an easy as well as an intuitively appealing
exercise. Yet criticizing the WPR as a failure after such an examination is also prob-
lematic since such criticism is based upon an incomplete and simplified picture of a
more complex situation. If one digs below the surface, it becomes readily apparent that
the WPR exerts an indirect and subtle effect on congressional action. It certainly did in
the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis.
112. Telephone interview with Dr. Lawrence Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower,
Reserve Affairs, Installations, and Logistics in the Reagan administration (Apr. 26, 1994).
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Member Data All cases House of Senate
Reps.
All cases 365 288 77
Party
Democrat 215 170 45
Republican 150 118 32
Elected
Pre-1970 37 29 8
1970-79 107 76 31
1980-85 102 88 14
1986-90 119 95 24
District marginality*
Under 60% 130 92 38
60% and over 234 196 38
Bush district support
54% and under 167 130 37
Over 54% 198 158 40
Region
East 71 55 16
Midwest 99 81 18
South 121 95 26
West 74 57 17
Vote on resolution to use
force
No 152 113 39
Yes 213 175 38
Committee or leadership
position
No 237 211 26
Yes 128 77 51
*Marginality statistics are missing for one senator who was appointed to his post.
Table 2 breaks down the sample, as a whole and by chamber, according to seven
contextual factors: (1) a member's party affiliation (with the sole Independent coded as
a Democrat); (2) a member's seniority; (3) a member's district marginality, based
113. According to Congressional Quarterly, "had [Sanders] voted as a Democrat, his party-unity
score would have been 84 percent; his opposition score would have been 8 percent; and his unity
Journal of Legislation [Vol. 21:23
on the most recent race prior to January 1991; (4) President Bush's support in a
member's district in the 1988 presidential election;" 4 (5) the region in which a
member's district falls; 5 (6) a member's vote on the resolution authorizing the use
of force in the Persian Gulf; and (7) whether a member held a leadership post or a
relevant committee position." 6 As seen in Table 2, the selection process clearly
achieved sample diversity.
score, adjusted for absences, would have been 92 percent." See Party Unity and Party Opposition:
House, 49 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3790 (1991). Considering these figures, it is logical for the purposes
of this research to code him as a Democrat.
114. Bush received about 54% of the popular vote nationwide. I thus used 54% as the bench mark
for testing a district's support for Bush: supportive districts included those in which Bush received
over 54% of the vote; nonsupportive districts qualified as those in which Bush received 54% of the
vote and under.
115. I used the 1986 U.S. Census Bureau's regional breakdown, reprinted in H. STANLEY & R.
NIEMI, VITAL STATISTICS ON AMERICAN POLITICS 366 (1988).
116. 1 defined relevant committee position broadly: House Foreign Affairs Committee; Senate For-
eign Relations Committee; House and Senate Armed Services Committees; House and Senate Select
Intelligence Committees; and House and Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittees and Defense Sub-
committees of the Appropriations Committees. Appropriations Committee members on other Appropria-
tions subcommittees have virtually no jurisdiction over topics under the Foreign Operations or Defense
Subcommittees' purview. See, e.g., S. SMIH & C. DEERING, COMMITrEES IN CONGRESS (2d ed. 1990);
E. Burgin, Representatives' Involvement in Foreign and Defense Policy Issues: Do Issue Characteristics
Affect Participation? 31 (1994) (forthcoming in Congress and the Presidency, Spring 1995).
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Appendix B
Interview Questions Asked of Members of Congress and Senior Bush
Administration Officials
After brief introductory remarks and a review of some key events in the Persian Gulf
crisis (as it occurred a few years earlier), I moved on to the questions. 
7
(1) Do you think that the WPR (or the existence of the WPR) had any effect on con-
gressional action in the Persian Gulf crisis? If so, how? If not, why not?
(2) If the WPR was not the law of the land, do you think that congressional action
might have been any different? If so, how? If not, why not?
(a) Do you think that the legislative action in October might have been different
if the WPR wasn't the law of the land?"'
(b) Do you think that Congress would have acted as it did regarding the forma-
tion of a joint bipartisan group of members to be available for consultation dur-
ing adjournment if the WPR hadn't been the law of the land?
(c) Do you think that Congress would have taken the legislative action that it did
in January if the WPR wasn't the law?
(3) Do you recall discussing the WPR during the Gulf crisis with your colleagues or
your staffers?
(a) If so, do you recall the point during the crisis in which it came up?
(b) If so, did you discuss it extensively with them?
4) (Depending on previous answers... ) In the telephone interviews with staffers,
over 60% of the aides said that they thought their bosses believed that the WPR affect-
ed congressional action in the Gulf crisis.
Depending on previous answers, I asked a, b, or c.
(a) Are you surprised in any way by this figure? If so, how? If not, why not?
(b) Are you surprised that this figure is so high? Explain.
(c) Are you surprised that this figure isn't higher? Explain.
(5) Do you think that the congressional action or inaction regarding the WPR in the
Persian Gulf crisis serves as an important precedent for either Congress or the execu-
tive? If so, how? If not, why not?
117. Note that in most cases I did not actually ask the precise question listed here, because the
matter arose naturally in the course of conversation.
118. I had reviewed the October legislative action, as well as all of the other actions listed below,
at the beginning of the interview.
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